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Paradigm Lost :Yugoslav Self-
Management and the Economics of
Disaster
P. H. Liotta
Democracies create free markets that offer economic opportunity, make for more
reliable trading partners and are less likely to wage war on one another.  While
democracy will not soon take hold everywhere, it is in our interest to do all
that we can to enlarge the community of free and open societies, especially in
areas of greatest strategic interest, as in Central and Eastern Europe.1
I believe it is easier to wage war than to organise [sic] the government and direct
social development, because these are complicated matters.2
1 During  much  of  the  1990’s,  American  foreign  policy  consistently  emphasized  the
promotion of democratic values and free market reforms as stabilizing influences and
forces for increased state and regional prosperity3. The ideological bases for these policy
influences, no matter how valid in principle, have failed to sufficiently appreciate that
Yugoslav disintegration was itself reflective of a larger European transformation from
socialist structures to market economies and democratic practices. Such transformation
holds the potential for increased regional interdependence and prosperity as much as it
provides the means for descent into economic disaster and societal collapse.
2 From an ecological perspective, the human and technological potentials that democratic
practices and economic reforms provide can prove disastrous if specific aspects predomi ‐
nate (such as, for example, would happen with a sharply increased emphasis on laissez-
faire private market incentives to the detriment of public, social guarantees). With regard
to  democracy,  a  number  of  policy  scholars  have  already  noted  the  rise  of  “illiberal
democracy”4.  A  White  House  diplomatic  envoy  expressed  the  significance  of  this
“illiberalism”  on  the  eve  of  democratic  elections  in  September  1996  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina,  when  he  pondered  the  real  possibility  that  “free  and  fair”  democratic
elections might well lead to the publicly supported selection of “racists, fascists, [and]
separatists who are publicly opposed to [peace and reintegration]”5.  Such democratic
practice, however, reflects the potential failure of constitutional liberalism (a process and a
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tradition that respects both individual liberty and the rule of law) to have taken deep root
in the post-Cold War era in the “new” Europe, despite the promise and optimism both
diplomats and policymakers saw in the Cold War’s aftermath6.
3 Further,  the  promise  that  democratic  institutionalization  could  eventually  bring  to
evolving governments and social structures in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as in
the nations of the former Soviet Union, can equally conflict with too rapidly enforced
economic  change.  The  economic  reforms  that  foreign  creditors  and  “Western”
governments  essentially  demanded  of  Yugoslavia  in  its  final  days  required  an
authoritarian regime to voluntarily reduce its own powers even as contrarian human and
technological forces demanded that the Yugoslav government retain what little authority
it still possessed in order to provide a stable civic order, sufficient legal enforcement, and
a living standard that could meet the expectations of a socialist order7. In such a case, the
intent of democratic practice and economic reform to bring about positive change in a
society proved counter-productive, and determinedly disastrous, by the introduction of
too rapid change.
4 The  failure  of  the  Yugoslav  state  to  provide  such  necessary  order  during  a  time  of
variously  attempted  economic  and  democratic  reforms  was  a  factor  that  allowed
ultra-“nationalist”  forces  to  take  hold,  forces  that  opposed  the  continuation  of  a
“Yugoslav” state. These opposing forces (Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, Serbian and
later “Yugoslav”  President  Slobodan  Milošević,  and  1997  candidate  for  the  Serbian
presidency,  Vojislav  Šešelj)  proved essential  to  the  ending of  Yugoslavia.  The state’s
failure to provide social order and social guarantees in a time of social transformation
virtually assured its inevitable decline.
5 Serbia, treated as the pariah Balkan state by the West ever since the last days of the
Yugoslav state in 1991, failed to achieve either democracy or economic reform by the end
of the decade. (In the fourth, failed run-off election of 21 December 1997, a Serbian voter
bluntly pronounced the dilemma facing voters in his nation : « We have a communist and
a fascist for the two presi dential candidates. What kind of democratic choice is that ? »8.)
By 1998, Serbia had come to represent the conditions of social chaos that economic and
foreign policy scholar Susan Woodward warned of in 1995 :
Economic  reforms  such  as  those  demanded  of  Yugoslavia  (...)  ask  for  political
suicide. (...)  Without a stable civil and legal order, the social conditions that are
created  can  be  explosive :  large-scale  unemployment  among  young  people  and
unskilled  urban  dwellers ;  demobilized  soldiers  and  security  police  looking  for
private employment ; thriving conditions for black market activities  and crime ;
and flourishing local and global traffic in small arms and ammunition9.
6 Former Yugoslavia thus provides a pertinent example of how the pressures of societal
expectations coupled with a mounting foreign debt crisis  can erode social  fabric and
accelerate declining living standards ; further, such decline in a condition of weak state
authority and intrastate tensions can often lead to conflict. From a social and strategic
management  perspective,  the  lessons  of  post-Yugoslav  Serbia  as  well  as  Bosnia-
Herzegovina foretell a potentially bleak future for European stability.
7 Ironically,  the  innovation  of  Yugoslav  “Self-Management”,  or  “Self-Government”—a
double meaning for the same word in Serb-Croatian, samoupravljanje—once considered a
benchmark in creative economic reform within a socialist society, proved to be a major
contributing factor in the death of Yugoslavia. An examination of both the promise and
lost opportunities of self-management might provide an appropriate—and cautionary—
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paradigm for the integration of the ideologies of democracy and free market reforms
within an evolving Europe in a new century.
 
The Promise of Self-Management
8 Despite the intentional claim by the post-World War II  Yugoslav government to have
found precedent for Yugoslav “Communism” in the writings of Karl Marx, the evolution
of  self-management rose directly  from the experience of  the war itself.  As  a  nation,
Yugoslavia had only existed in political union since 1918, a stepchild, as it was, of the
Treaty of Versailles. During World War II,  however, that “union” had shattered along
ethnic  lines  and fierce  fighting among indigenous  “Yugoslav”  forces  (such as  Ustaše, 
^etnici, Bela Garda, Domobrani, and Partisans) in an area of complete Nazi occupation. At
the same time, Yugoslav Partisan resistance to overwhelming Nazi power—in terms of
forces—proved  so  effective  that  British  Prime  Minister  Winston  Churchill  argued
successfully to switch Allied allegiance from the Yugoslav Chetnik resistance fighters to
the Partisans, led by a Croat-Slovene named Josip Broz—in later years, simply known as
“Tito”10.
9 Tito’s subsequent independence of thought and demands for sovereignty for his post-
World  War  II  state  led  to  an  inevitable  collision  with  Joseph  Stalin,  the  nominal
ideological world leader for the Communist movement. Stalin’s furor over Tito’s refusal
to adhere to Marxist-Leninist doctrine above a national “South Slav” affiliation led to
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the International Communist organization, the Cominform,
in 194811. This tension between the Soviet Union would last until 1955, culminating in the
state visit of Nikita Kruschev to Belgrade12.  (Yugoslavia’s peaceful separation from the
USSR also influenced the Hungarian uprising of 1956 and the Czechoslovak movement
known as “Socialism with a human face” in the spring of 1968.) Yugoslavia, in the late
1940’s, grew convinced of a Soviet invasion through the province of Vojvodina (which
bordered Hungary) and both re-located industry from Serbia into Croatia and Slovenia
and thought creatively about new, independent ways to strategically manage the social
framework of a “new” Yugoslav state.
10 One of the unique aspects of such individual and creative strategic innovation was the
creation of Yugoslav self-management. In theory, the pivot of Titoism maintained that
socialism would dictate the “withering away of the state”—an idea in direct opposition to
the  Soviet  strategic  management  of  a  bigger,  increasingly  stronger,  increasingly
centralized state13.  Tito recognized the Soviet model of government ownership of the
means  of  production  as  little  more  than  a  fiction.  He  thus  pushed  for  sweeping
decentralization  and  economic  liberalization.  Under  Tito,  then,  the  worker’s  self-
management system was meant, in its purest conception, to provide the opposite of a
Soviet-type dominance over the worker ; the “new” Yugoslav worker, by contrast, was
intended to have democratic control and a democratic voice in the daily activity of work.
In retrospect, five decades later, this visionary social management seems extraordinary.
11 In a prescient image of management texts and innovative articles on new management
thinking (found most often in the Harvard Business Review) at the millennium’s end14, self-
management sought innovation in a system that resembled an inverted pyramid in which
workers from the lower echelons controlled and mandated the decisions made by higher
management. Yugoslav self-management was, in theory at least, akin to democracy—tied
to the tenet that basic decisions would be made by the workers who would have to carry
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out such decisions or be most affected by them15. Worker’s councils, composed of as many
as 50 individuals in large factories, represented the “will” of the worker. Further, since
the  state  itself  was  intended  to  wither  away,  political  leadership  attempted  to  shift
responsibilities to the worker’s commune—or opština (općina)—which was meant, in turn,
to raise its own funds, sets its own budgets, and provide workers with necessary social
services16.
12 Thus, the factory was meant to be an autonomous and competitive organization. Self-
management represented « an indirectly controlled market economy, with elements of
Keynesianism [that is, based on the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes] as well as
Marxism »17.  The  worker’s  council  was  the  basic  operations  unit—deciding  what  and
whom to pay, what wages to give, how best to reallocate profits after taxes and operating
costs were made. Unlike a capitalist economy in which shareholders determine both the
allocation of resources and decide on how best to use capital, self-management provided
a system whereby workers themselves were shareholders. The worker was not able to
individually invest his or her earnings but would reap in the collective wealth of the
organization. The worker’s only task was to make a profit for the organization.
13 The National Assembly of Yugoslavia adopted the Worker’s Self-Management Act on 26
June 1950 ; it was not until 1952, however, that relevant portions of the Act took hold in
the economic transition that  attempted to  allow more independence for  enterprises,
broader worker rights, and to introduce elements of market practices18.  Workers, in a
legally  mandated  precedent,  could—through  elected  worker’s  councils—approve
enterprise plans and accounting, make management decisions, make initial regulations,
dismiss management committees that proved unsatisfactory, and distribute profits after
taxes19.
14 In accordance with Marxist theory, the core root of inequality between individuals and
classes is the ownership of the means of production ; thus, the search for new paradigms
led to self-management socialism. Private ownership was thus allowed in the production
of  various  crafts,  agriculture,  services,  transport,  catering and tourism,  but  the  con ‐
tribution of these “industries” to overall Gross Domestic Product was small20.
15 Self-management, by contrast, both in its conception and during its first decade of exis ‐
tence, seemed to hold the promise of individual “de-alienation, the liberation of work,
and  direct  democracy”  for  large-scale  industry.  Indeed,  self-management  provided  a
model that a number of other countries sought to replicate in their own societies to
improve both effi ciency and worker contributions21.
16 There appears never to have been any official declaration on the aims of self-manage ‐
ment. As Harold Lydall notes22, however, it is reasonable to claim that the general aims of
self-management were to create an “industrial democracy,” one in which workers held
the same right of control (and censure) over policy as citizens in a democracy nominally
hold similar control over their own government. Thus, in its time, Yugoslavia proved
itself a maverick state, one neither Western nor Soviet-inspired23.
17 Yugoslavia’s innovative bureaucratic structures invited attention ;  at the heart of this
attention, and this innovation, lay the system of Yugoslav self-management socialism,
one  in  which  workers  participated  in  decision-making  at  the  enterprise  level.  Since
democracy  remained  a  titular  desirable  aim  of  both  Communist  and  socialist
governments, self-management in itself would appear to be in concert with such aims.
Further,  while  it  might  appear  premature  to  argue  that  self-management  from  its
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inception in 1950 was an intentional move to decentralize control from Belgrade and
move  toward  a  loose  federation  of  republics  (that  led  to  the  disintegration  of  the
Yugoslav state in 1991), the concept of “the withering away of the state” remained, in
proclamation at least, a desired goal. In reality, various economic pressures in the 1960’s
helped bring about this potential while no sufficient alternative arose to replace the state
that had withered away.
 
The Failure of Self-Management
18 From 1952 to 1965, Yugoslavia witnessed the golden age of its economy, rivaling Japan as
the fastest growing worldwide economy24. Labor-managed firms seemed to allow freedom
of choice and direction for workers ; equally, self-management was an indicator both of a
market economy taking root and the presence of economic democracy within Yugoslavia.
From  1950-1985,  only  Taiwan  (6,64  percent),  Japan  (6,26  percent)  and  China  (5,10)
produced Gross National Product (GNP) rates that exceeded Yugoslavia’s (4,46)25.
19 In particular, the year 1960 saw Yugoslavia « riding a wave of unprecedented prosperity »
26.  Agricultural  yields,  the  rise  in  imports,  demand  in  consumer  goods  along  with
extended  lines  of  consumer  credit  were  as  high  as  ever.  Yugoslavia,  the  “different”
Communist state, attracted worldwide attention. By 1962, overextension of credit, a rapid
decline—and eventual depletion—of personal savings, and a failure in industrial output to
match the boom in demand brought serious consequences that the miracle of the 1950’s
could not sustain27.
20 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) finance minister who most furthered early
Yugoslav  economic  reform  (beginning  in  May  1952)  was  a  Macedonian  named  Kiro
Gligorov (who became the first president of independent Macedonian in 1991). Gligorov
attempted to bring wage goods back into line, devalued the Yugoslav dinar in order to
stimulate  export  production,  while  simultaneously  cutting  public  expenditures  and
loosening  state  control  over  financial  accountability  in  order  to  release  available
resources for manufacturers. One consequence of his actions, nonetheless, was the rise in
corrupt misuse of such loosened financial accountability and the subsequent abuse of
funds as newly available “working capital” was released to various industries28.
21 There are a number of causes for the failure of self-management. Perhaps the simplest
and most  viable explanation is  that  of  « the psychology of  rising expectations »29.  As
Lydall  notes,  the  naïve  belief  that  workers,  given the  right  to  elect  councils  and be
consulted with referenda would equally act to safeguard the interest of “society” was an
inherent flaw30. Workers were excluded from significant decisions, a truth best indicated by
the evidence that executive appointments of top-level “directors” rested firmly in the
hands of Yugoslav politicians31. Indeed, the irrelevance of workers’ councils, the one body
over which all workers have the democratic right to control and censure enterprise, was
demonstrated during the  wave of  strikes  that  began in  1987.  Workers  demanded an
increase in income ; their demands were passed directly to enterprise “directors”, and
bypassed workers’ councils.
22 A  brief  consideration  of  the  rapid  rise  in  “work  stoppages”—an  essential  Yugoslav
euphemism for “strike”—reveals a striking parallel with the general societal declines that
led to the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. In 1987 there were 1 262 work stoppages
(involving 196 000 workers), decidedly more than the 851 strikes for 88 860 workers in
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198632 ; in 1988, the number of strikes rose to 1 720 strikes involving 388 000 workers33.
(Although  strikes  were  commonplace  for  years,  the  right  to  strike  was  not
constitutionally guaranteed until November 1988 ; in 1989, the law itself was under fierce
debate in the federal assembly.) By 1990, the number of yearly strikes had risen to 1 900
strikes, involving 470 000 workers, and an inflation rate that soared to 2 500 percent34. By
1990, in the final months of the Yugoslav state, the national labor federation (CITUY) of
Yugoslavia, had become an empty shell ; worker unions tended to align with nationalist
allegiances within specific republics (or with dominant ethnic groups within republics)35.
23 The transformation  of  union leaders  from government  mouthpieces  to  “democratic”
representatives for workers’ rights also took root in the late 1980’s. Leaders began to
advocate workers’ interests on matters such as the impact of inflation, standard of living,
and wage policies.  (Under self-management,  union leaders,  by contrast,  had played a
minor  role  in  representing  workers’  interest  in  the  management  of  enterprise,
distribution of income, settlement of disputes, and conduct of strikes.) By 1988, there was
a clear distinction between the official  Council  of Trade Unions of  Yugoslavia,  which
supported  official  government  policy,  and  local  trade  union  trade  union  leadership,
which increasingly represented worker rights in establishing unprecedented strike codes
and arguing for wage policies to prevent income losses that amounted to a reduction in
real wages earned of 21,5 percent in one year36.
24 As Lydall has noted, for any enterprise to work efficiently it must have an efficient en ‐
terprise  structure,  effective  management,  and  incentives  and  discipline37 ;  self-
management,  in  its  actual  form,  possessed  none  of  these  features.  Thus,  the  rising
number of strikes against enterprise proved a significant event. In a purely competitive
and “free”  self-management  system,  workers  would have no reason to  strike  against
themselves.  In  practice,  nonetheless,  the  high  degree  of  government  intervention  in
enterprise  affairs  provoked  adverse  reaction  in  workers.  Workers  were  striking  not
against enterprise, but against government policy38.
25 Eventually,  self-management’s  potential  could  not  be  sustained  by  the  system  that
created it (particularly by those republics that never intended to remain in Yugoslavia).
The  1974  amendment  to  the  federal  constitution  of  Yugoslavia  essentially
institutionalized the autonomy of the six Yugoslav republics, thus implicitly allowing the
acceleration of national - economic- and ethno-centrisms.
26 Yugoslavia’s unique brand of socialism and capitalism also thwarted private initiative,
effectively  renouncing  individual  aims  as  “selfish”.  Self-management,  in  practice,
promoted « the formation of an economic system [that fostered] equality rather than
differentiation according to unequal ability »39. Non-profitable firms could not be sold ;
thus, firms in a socialist economy could operate under a soft budget constraint40.
27 From 1979 to 1985, in a kind of mirror event of the larger decline in industry production,
social product services fell  significantly.  Education, health, and housing services were
unable  to  meet  the  demand  of  rising  social  needs.  Productivity  fell  by  20  percent ;
workers’ incomes fell by 25 percent ; by 1987, inflation was at 150 percent per annum41.
By contrast, from 1952 to 1975, inflation had peaked only once—from 1965 to 1966—rising
to  30  percent42.  Further  exacerbating  the  problem  of  disintegration  was  economic
polarization :  by  the  1980’s  personal  income  in  the  southern  Yugoslav  Republic  of
Macedonia was less than half that of the northern Republic of Slovenia ; in the southern
autonomous province of Kosovo, the increased number of so-called “peasant” households
and larger family sizes equally accentuated economic difference43.
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28 The ultimate failure of self-management thus lay perhaps in the failure of the “withering
away of  the state”—or the socialization of  centralized government to lower levels  of
effective,  instrumental,  self-managed  budgets44.  Demographics  illustrated  that  the
Yugoslav  work  force,  responding  to  state  initiatives,  had  increasingly  moved  from
private,  subsistence  agriculture  into  a  public  sector  that  could  not  grow  at  a  pace
sufficient to supply the jobs required by such displacement45. Eventually, and at its most
basic and divisive level, self-management became a forum for struggles over wages within
the workplace. 
29 The supposed harmonizing influence of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia became one
more element in the fracturing of economic division :
Conflicts over substantive policy were redefined as conflicts over the distribution of
money—over budgetary revenues and tax policy, transfers and subsidies, and the
locus of control over monetary policy, foreign exchange allocation and banking46.
30 One perhaps minor but illustrative example of the federal government’s inability to meet
transformed social and societal expectations occurred in 1987, when a conference titled
« Possibilities for Reform in Socialist States », sponsored by the Center for Philosophy and
Social Theory, was canceled at the final moment, possibly out of concern for adverse
reaction from Warsaw Pact states47.
31 A larger example of the state’s inability to accept criticism was reflected in published law
that  forbade  criticism of  both  former  President  Tito  and Socialist  self-management ;
dissident  Jovan Opačić,  for  example,  was  jailed  in  1989 after  interrupting an official
commemoration in Knin and being charged with « committing a criminal  act  against
Social self-management (...) and against the reputation of Yugoslavia »48.
32 By 1991, the self-management system was being phased out. Economic reforms begun in
1990,  had  attempted  to  reduce  government  regulation,  reform  the  banking  system,
expand private competition and encourage foreign investment.  Such reform attempts
had collapsed by 1991 under the pressures of high inflation, decreased production rates,
high unemployment, and increasing fracturing of the economy along republic and ethnic
lines49.
 
The « Ecological » Meaning of Failure
33 Marshal  Tito’s  1974  constitutional  reform  appears  now  to  have  created  two  ironic
contradictions. In political terms, Tito, it seems obvious, wanted to ensure no leader of
his particular and central stature in the Yugoslav state could replace him as ikon ; this
explains the establishment of a federal presidency that was little more than a figurehead
position50. In economic terms, Tito’s decentralized system was meant to delegate power
and authority to republics and local governments in order to preserve stability among
various conflicting ethnic nationalities.
34 The effects  of decentralization may indeed have prolonged the  eventual  death of  the
Yugoslav state. At the same time, however, the removal of effective power from a central
government contributed to the ineffectiveness of government reforms in the last days of
the Yugoslav state. Self-management in its true sense, nevertheless, provided a number of
advantages over a Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist type economy. Not only did the system allow
for competition between similar enterprises, it allowed equally for worker and manager
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innovation and the practice of free market-type relations. Thus, in the 1950’s and 1960’s,
Yugoslavia experienced rapid economic progress. 
35 At  the  same  time,  inherent  system  weaknesses  led  to  economic  stagnation.  These
weaknesses include the truth that under a laissez-faire self-management system there still
would  not  exist  the  competitive  “spur”  of  private  enterprise ;  under  socialist self-
management,  such as  in  Yugoslavia—in which  workers  had no  ownership  rights—no
potential  existed  to  influence  decisions  on  investment,  technology,  or  management
appointments51. With over 500 communes and power distributed to various republics and
political  elites,  the  Yugoslav  federation  had  indeed  created  the  “dictatorship  of  the
Proletariat”52. Thus, although Yugoslav self-management differed significantly from the
negative, Stalinist model in how it encouraged initiative both in economic and political
life,  it  still  contained  essential  flaws.  In  the  truest  sense,  the  Communist  model  of
“Reward according to need” transformed, in Yugoslav ideology, to “Reward according to
work” and finally to “Reward according to the results of work”53. The essential problem
remained that rewards lagged increasingly behind any expectation of results during the
1970’s and 1980’s.
36 According to Mencinger, self-management passed through four distinct systemic phases
during  its  existence :  administrative  socialism  (1945-1952) ;  administrative  market
socialism  (1953-1962) ;  market  socialism  (1963-1973) ;  and  contractual  socialism
(1974-1988), followed by collapse54. These phases, in the space of four decades, mark the
shift from an agricultural, capitalist society into an industrial socialist society. 
37 An alternate perspective shows the extraordinary determination of the Yugoslav people
to  transform  themselves  in  the  wake  of  World  War  II—a  war  which  was  both  an
internecine  civil  war  (among  various  warring  Serbian,  Croatian,  and  Macedonian
elements) and a war for national “liberation” from Nazi occupation under Marshall Tito.
It was perhaps only through Tito’s iron rule (in which he purged dissident elements and
maintained an extraordinarily efficient secret police) that such transformation from a
largely agricultural to industrial societal base could take place.
38 The unique aspect of the Yugoslav experience is that its Communist government in the
early years, unlike other East European nations, enjoyed widespread popular support,
largely because of  its  determined resistance to Nazi  occupation55.  Thus,  although the
Communist regime was able to withstand the pressures of decentralization (which began
in 1974) far longer than other East European nations that fractured quickly in the last
days of 1989, the rise of fractious nationalist identities, along with the inherent truth that
meeting  the  needs  of  workers  without  accompanying  economic  growth  seemed
increasingly difficult, proved to be disastrous “ecological” elements for the state56.
39 In retrospect, those who still favor a self-management system that is in theory, correct,
seem somehow unable to recognize the truth of one Yugoslav economist’s comment that
self-management  was  a  system « for  angels  and not  for  men »57.  The  façade  of  self-
management, as Zagorka Golubović has rightly noted, lies in the inherent incompatibility
between  democratic  practice  and  the  control  of  a  one-party  Marxist  state.  Self-
management was bound to fail because workers and enterprise itself had no real influence
—despite the claims of the (one-party Marxist) state—on decision making, production
process, or social policy58. The reasons for failure can be thus summarized, briefly, as :
1. Yugoslav society rested on a form of control from a single “all encompassing”
ruling ideology. This reality excluded the basic principles of self-organization, self-
determination, self-management, and self-government.
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2.  The real  authority  of  the state allowed,  at  best,  a  “paternalistic  self-manage ‐
ment.” Self-management was an appendage to the state, rather than its alternative.
3. Self-management was developed by those who implemented Stalinist post-war
development in Yugoslavia until 1948. Thus, self-management was neither a form of
social innovation nor a theoretical reassessment of the Soviet model, but rather a
form of appropriation in the hands of those who maintained real power59.
40 Further,  according  to  Adamović  and  Pavlović,  five  significant  factors  impeded
Yugoslavia’s  democratic  transition,  and by extension true market  reform,  in the late
1980’s :
1.  The  pressures  for  change  were  not  as  radical  in  Yugoslavia  as  in  other  East
European countries after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
2. Post-Cold War Yugoslavia failed to make radical democratic changes.
3. Yugoslavia had wedged itself, during the Cold War, between bipolar superpowers
and was slow to appreciate the meaning of the changed international order.
4.  The  power  of  one-party  and  one-person  (Marshall  Tito)  politics  destroyed
Yugoslavia’s ability to create independent political identities;
5. Socialism itself retarded the development of civil society60.
41 Although  the  Law  of  Enterprise  of  January  1989  is  generally  considered  the  official
“ending” of self-management, 18 actual laws passed in the period 1988 to 1989 marked
the effective end of  self-management61.  Then Prime Minister  Ante Marković‘s  “shock
therapy” stabilization program in the spring of 1990, coupled with liberalizing economic
measures to include full foreign ownership, seemed to hold the potential for a Yugoslav
recovery. Such recovery, if only an economic one, could not take place in isolation from
other  pressures.  In  December  1990,  the  Slovene  electorate  voted  for  full  national
independence by June 1991 and subsequent accompanying demands by both the Croatian
and  Slovenian  governments  to  assume  federal  jurisdiction  over  legislation,  laws,
administration of justice, and police enforcement, which led not to further confederation
and decentralization but to civil war.
42 From  1963  to  1973,  the  slowdown  in  economic  progress  coupled  with  rising
unemployment  and  accompanying  social  pressures  virtually  assured  the  end  of  the
Yugoslav  miracle.  The  eventual  death  of  the  system  itself,  coupled  by  increasing
administrative measures with no consideration for economic theory, proved to have only
significant negative results. From 1952-1962, the annual Gross National Product averaged
an impressive 8,2 percent ; by 1980-1988, the GNP average had slowed to a trickle—0,6
percent62.
43 One central “cause” for self-management’s failure, nonetheless, can be explained simply
in  human  terms.  While  Yugoslavs  did  manage  themselves  within  factories  to  a
considerable degree, they also acted in what should be considered the most human way in
an  environment  that  allowed  them  to  act  freely.  With  little  regard  for  production,
workers, obsessively perhaps, pursued what in Serbo-Croatian was called trka za dinarom
(running after dinars). Workers raised wages. 
44 This inherent “self”-incentive,  uncoupled from an equal  rise in production rates and
along  with  a  rash of  unwise  governmental  economic  investments,  along  with  an
increasingly  liberal  lending  policy  without  regulatory  control  (quite  similar  to  the
practices that led to the Southeast Asian economic crisis of 1997), produced inevitable
results. Unlike the International Monetary Fund intervention in controlling the economic
crisis of 1997 in South Korea, however, Tito refused “market intervention”, advocated
laissez-faire economics,  and relied on the law of supply and demand 63.  For an avowed
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Communist and for what was doctrinally a Communist state, this intervention refusal
seems extraordinary.
45 In the words of Adam Smith, the « skill, dexterity, and judgment [applied to] the greatest
improvement in the productive powers of labour [sic] » lead to the most effective results64
.  By contrast and partially as a counter-response to the “exploitation” of the laborer,
Marx  saw  future  capitalist,  free  market  societies  as  practicing  a  modern  theory  of
colonization : « the only thing that interests the new world [is] the political economy of
the old world (...)  the capitalist mode of production and accumulation, and therefore
capitalist private property, have for their fundamental condition the annihilation of self-
earned  private  property;  in  other  words,  the  expropriation  of  the  labourer »65 [sic].
Today,  in  the  post-Cold  War  and  post-Yugoslav  era,  both  Smith’s  and  Marx’s  words
contain  essential  truths  and  contradictory  tensions.  The  necessary  balance  is  to
harmonize the needs of the worker with marketplace profit.
46 Self-management  in  former  Yugoslavia  was  imposed  from the  top  down  (by  the
government), rather than pushed forward from the bottom up (by the workers for whom
self-management was first established “to protect”). Self-management, in its way, proved
an acceptable substitute for self-government until its inherent weaknesses betrayed it. 
47 Thus, some essential “ecological” truths about societal structure may be gleaned from the
experience of failure. These truths include variations on the theme that the basic rights
of a civil society must prevail and the individual citizen must have the right to exercise a
voice that cannot exist in a one-party state. The Staatsrecht—a state in which the rule of
law  allows  the  guarantee  of  civil  rights,  including  self-governing  rights,  and  the
independence  of  social  activities—should  prove  the  essential  guarantor  of  societal
stability66. In essence then, the idealized Yugoslav “de-etatization”—the “withering away of
the  state”—  which  began  in  1955  and  was  foreseen  to  finally  allow  self-managed
organizations to take control, was impossible. Some form of higher level control, at a
federal level, was required67.
48 The economic failure of Yugoslavia is linked to human failures in motivation and control.
Yet what happened in Yugoslavia (and may happen again) is a possibility in the new
Europe—one that includes West, East, the Caucasus, the Crimean Basin, Central Asia, and
the Balkans. Aside from the widespread environmental damage (both human and natural)
done to Yugoslavia, the process of economic growth came to reject Marx’s reform-minded
conception of the reconciliation of humanity with nature; in essence, Yugoslavia rejected
both the technological and human factors that were required for its continued existence68
.
49 The  Yugoslav  example  shows  that  democratic  practice  such  as  that  which  self-
management at its core intended itself to be, works best—and perhaps works only—at the
level  of  small  enterprise.  The Yugoslav  state,  nonetheless,  was  the  ultimate  decision
maker; this was also a one-party, non-democratic system that sanctioned, in its final days,
every impor tant aspect of executive decision making69. Thus, the issue of trans parency of a
company, popular in contemporary terms, is also a relevant one. Self-management failed
because the Yugoslav government would not allow true worker democracy ; the Yugoslav
self-managed worker likely had far less power than a worker in private enterprise who
belonged to an effective trade union70.
50 As Gapisnki, Škegro, Zuehlke point out, even an American political system would prove
itself incapable of change when all inevitable decisions meant only substantial income
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losses71.  The Yugoslav example by the late  1980’s  showed that  unless  reform had an
immediate short-term effect and did not overcome worsening of the distribution of gains
losses, the reform itself was bound to fail. The status quo, no matter how terminally ill its
central core might be, became the standard to protect.
51 Statistical evidence shows that Yugoslav workers acted most often out of motivation only
to increase personal  income ;  such “motivation” may equally have come to influence
official state ideology72. Thus, the “system” of self-management had little to do with the
act of managing daily life. By contrast, Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs became preoccupied
(some might say obsessed) with the standard of living73.
52 The  disintegration  of  Yugoslavia,  and  the  creation  of  six  newly  independent  states
(Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) was the partial
result  of  different approaches and transition processes in the move from publicly to
privately owned market-economy structures. Along with the disintegration of a federal
structure came the disintegration of federal legal structures that might have regulated
such transition between Yugoslav republics74.
53 Even the significant economic reforms of the late 1980’s and early 1990, uncoupled from
other  ecological  factors  that  would  insure  societal  stability,  proved  fruitless.  Prime
MinisterAnte Marković‘s economic austerity program of the late 1980’s saw the inflation
rate drop from a high of 2 500 percent in 1989 to 8,4 percent in February 1990. Further,
Marković‘s  Communist Reform Party,  a true coalition of Yugoslav identities—favoring
revisionist Islamic, Serbian, Croatian, and socialist elements—showed the potential of a
continued Yugoslav identity along with a major program of economic reform75.
54 Yet, despite the influence of often overwhelming government regulation, banking system
reform and the expansion of competition through the increase of private enterprise and
increased foreign investment, Marković‘s economic reforms provided a temporary, but
not  long-term,  solution.  By  1993,  what  remained of  Yugoslavia  under  the  mantle  of
Slobodan Milošević was a ruin : the Yugoslav Statistics Bureau revealed that inflation that
year grew at a rate of 0,7 percent an hour, 20 190 percent monthly, and translated into an
annual inflation rate of 286 billion percent76.
55 The true ecological meaning of self-management’s failure—and the subsequent failure of
the state—lay in how an innovative system could not be sustained by the structure that
nominally provided support for it. (Further damaging were well intentioned international
efforts to economically blockade Serbia and Montenegro after Yugoslavia’s demise.) Such
ecological  devastation  to  the  environment  and  to  the  peoples  of  former  Yugoslavia
resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, economic repercussions
that continue today, and a perplexing security problem for future European stability.
56 The extraordinary change in “culture” during the decades of self-management appears
now to have been insufficient to transform the Yugoslav themselves. By contrast, the
galvanizing  post-World  War  II  force  of  Communist  ideology  and  partisan  resistance
proved  sufficient  to  unite a  population  toward  the  goal  of  national  liberation  while
equally providing sufficient force to “mobilize” this sentiment in postwar reconstruction
77. Such fervor could not, and did not, last forever.
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The Significance of Failure
57 In his 1971 memoir, former Yugoslav economic minister (in the early 1950’s) Svetozar
Vukmanović-Tempo suggested that  the best  strategic  “weapon” Yugoslavia  could use
against  the  United States  would  be  to  send two Yugoslav  planners  to  help  ruin  the
American economy78.  The Yugoslav example is  not  an isolated one.  While Yugoslavia
represented in its time a significantly “experimental” socialist society—one that allowed
freedom of travel for its citizens and toyed with various free market ideas—the meaning
of its disintegration should not be considered in isolation. Indeed, the neighboring nation
of Bulgaria, which during the 1990’s hovered near economic collapse after casting off its
Cold War socialist legacy, demonstrated how fundamental tensions between democratic
practices, economic reforms, and competing governmental forces hold the potential for
the breakdown of political and civil order79. Bulgaria, nonetheless, managed to survive
despite  these  tensions.  The  economic  failure  of  the  Yugoslav  state,  of  which  self-
management was a major contributing factor in Yugoslavia’s post-World War II history,
may well  replicate itself  in future instabilities both in Central  Europe and in various
nations of the former Soviet Union.
58 What remains perhaps most significant about the Yugoslav “Experiment” lies in how far
ahead of its time it was. The post-World War II “new” Yugoslavia was a decentralized
nation of six federated republics and two self-governing regions (Vojvodina and Kosovo).
Democratic participation, albeit under a strict one-party rule, was a uniquely Yugoslav
innovation ; a collision course with the Soviet Union in 1948 seems now, in retrospect,
inevitable. At the same time, the structure of the internal security mechanism within
Yugoslavia was the most  powerful  in Eastern Europe80.  This  seeming contradiction is
significant in its implication for the future Europe : in the inevitable decentralization of
power in Yugoslavia, the central oligarchy became eventually replaced by separate, often
contradictory  and  frequently  competitive  oligarchies81.  The  fracturing  of  the  state
became not only a struggle for control of scarce resources but an ideological battle for
nationalist identity.
59 Tito’s own political entrenchment follows the pattern of Yugoslavia’s progressive—and by
extension, social—decline. Expelled from the Cominform in 1948, Tito approved the self-
management initiative that began its golden “miracle” era in 1953. That same year, Tito
was re-elected president after his first five-year term and repeatedly re-elected. In 1963,
the year that marked self-management’s “miracle” end and its permanent decline, Tito
was elected president for an unlimited term. In 1971, Tito was established as chairman of
the  newly  created  collective  presidency  and  Yugoslavia  entered  a  descending  spiral
fueled by contributory, ecological factors that led to its inevitable disintegration. The
economy itself, a major contributory factor of significance in the death of Yugoslavia,
weakened in the 1970’s  under high inflation,  increasing foreign debt,  and inefficient
industry.
60 In a remarkably prescient article that appeared in The Atlantic Monthly in December 1962,
journalist  Fred  Warner  Neal  correctly  questioned  the  viability  of  self-management’s
continued success under a Titoist  system82.  Although Neal  articulated the miraculous
transformation of  an agricultural  society to a  competitive  industrial  economy in the
space of two decades, he also noted the numerous potential weaknesses of its system.
While  production  in  1961  showed  the  sharpest  increases  worldwide,  the  inherent
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contradictory pressures of free enterprise and collective ownership, in essence a unique
blend of Keynesianism and Marxism, was bound to lead to a bad end. Yugoslavia, as a
breakaway Communist state that clearly differed from the Soviet paradigm, also received
significant foreign aid : various claims show that the United States gave Yugoslavia $1,5
billion in  economic  assistance from 1950 to  1959 as  well  as  $724 million in  military
assistance83.
61 The economic  reforms that  foreign creditors  and “Western”  governments  essentially
demanded of Yugoslavia in its final days required an authoritarian regime to voluntarily
reduce its own powers even as contrarian human and technological forces demanded that
the Yugoslav government retain what little authority it still possessed in order to provide
a stable transition period. The failure of the Yugoslav state to provide such necessary
order during a  time of  variously attempted economic and democratic  reforms was a
factor  that  allowed  ultra-  “nationalist”  forces  to  take  hold,  forces  that  opposed  the
continuation of a “Yugoslav” state.
62 The Yugoslav example thus provides a pertinent example of how the pressures of societal
expectations coupled with an eroding social fabric in a condition of weak state authority
and intrastate tensions can often lead to conflict. From a social and strategic management
perspective, the lessons of post-Yugoslav Serbia as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina foretell a
potentially  bleak  future  for  European  stability.  The  innovation  of  Yugoslav  self-
management,  once  considered  a  benchmark  in  creative  economic  reform  within  a
socialist society, proved to be a major contributing factor in the death of Yugoslavia. 
 
Implications for State and Regional Stability
63 A number of inferences for future European stability, if not lessons, can be drawn from
the Yugoslav experience. First, as Spegele has noted in regard to international economics,
the notion that the core motivation for robust globalism is human emancipation (that is,
in a political and societal context, the embedding of constitutional liberalism within a social
framework),  takes  its  logic  not  from the  writings  of  Adam Smith,  but  from Marxist
tradition84.
64 Secondly, in what is perhaps the most extraordinary irony of the post-Cold War era : the
most pertinent and cautionary critic of globalism and free market incentives that are not
tied to responsible social initiatives is none other than the scourge of capitalism, Karl
Marx. A review of Marx’s writings, particularly Das Kapital, reveals sufficient evidence, in
an age of globalism, that side effects of globalization—corporate tax shelters, child labor,
closed down factories, dwindling social support programs—can lead more toward global
disintegration than integration if taken to an extreme85. While Marx seems clearly to have
erred in his trumpeting of the coming triumph of Communism, he may well remain the
most accurate critic of (current and future) capitalism in its purest form.
65 Thirdly, as a number of economic observers have begun to realize, economic flexibility
and societal cohesion are inherently linked factors in periods of political transformation.
Continued emphasis on globalization, which in a European context is best represented by
the  expansion  of  the  European  Union,  requires  considerable  economic,  social,  and
cultural adaptation—even within societies and cultures linked by common history and
heritage86.
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66 Finally, the most critical and difficult implication for future European stability lies in a
continued  commitment  to  support  those  structures  “outside”  the  framework  of  a
strategic vision that seeks only economic gain. The most pertinent example, of course, is
that of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Although the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank have recently placed increased importance on macroeconomic structural programs
that are coupled to demands that governments both root out corruption and respond to
stricter internal reforms87, it remains far too early to predict the success of Bosnia as a
future state.
67 The most likely outcome is that Bosnia, if it survives, will become a weak, economically
fragile, and relatively unstable nation for some time to come. Equally, Bosnia will require
significant support in the form of military (the 36 member NATO-led Stabilization Force)
and  economic  (World  Bank)  assistance.  As  for  Serbia,  continued  ostracism  by  the
international  community—particularly  by  the  United  States—will  both  prolong  and
exacerbate integration within the European security architecture. Economic assistance
for both Bosnia and Serbia, as Susan Woodward has noted, should not allow the continued
opportunity  for  local  crime  networks  to  capitalize  on  foreign  investment  and  route
construction activities, transport operations, and other foreign assistance to the benefit
of dominant political parties, state corruption, and provide future opportunities for the
proliferation of criminal activity88.
68 The dangers for the future post-Yugoslav states, thus, are similar to the dangers all post-
Cold  War  Europe  faces.  From the  perspective  of  the  classical  liberalist thinker,  Ralf
Dahrendorf, these dangers rise squarely out of conditions that exist when « economic
values begin to dominate politics (...  )  [and] liberty is at risk. The new economism of
capitalism is no less illiberal that the old one of Marxism »89. The challenge for European
stability, as Dahlendorf examines it, is to reconcile the often contradictory tensions of
prosperity, solidarity, and liberty. Indeed, as the disastrous Yugoslav example illustrates,
economic growth and economic disintegration are conditions that rarely, if ever, occur in
isolation.
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